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COMMENT
THE 501(c)(3) CAMPAIGN PROHIBITION AS APPLIED TO
CHURCHES: A CONSIDERATION OF THE
PROHIBITION'S RATIONALE, CONSTITUTIONALITY,
AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Jeffrey Mikell Johnsont
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 31,2004, just two days before the presidential election, the Rev.
George Regas preached a politically-charged sermon at All Saints Episcopal
Church in Pasadena, California.1 Although Regas cautioned the audience that
he did not intend to tell them how to vote, he proceeded to unabashedly
criticize the Iraq War and incumbent President George W. Bush's policies on
abortion, the economy, and various social issues.2 Regas told the parishioners
"to vote all [their] values" and admonished them to "[b]ring a sensitive
conscience to that ballot box."
3
The content of his message prompted the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
to investigate the tax-exempt status of the church. In June 2005, the IRS sent
the church a notification letter stating that it had a reasonable belief that All
Saints may not be tax-exempt because of its intervention in an election
campaign.4 The letter revealed that Regas's sermon was the source of the IRS's
concern.5 In September 2006, the IRS served All Saints with a summons
requesting the church to hand over numerous documents from the 2004 tax
year, including parish newsletters, vestry meeting minutes, and information
relating to Regas's involvement with the parish.6
One year later, the IRS sent All Saints a letter advising the church that it
continued to qualify for tax exemption.7 The IRS concluded, however, that
f Law Clerk to the Honorable Alice M. Batchelder, United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. J.D., 2007, Liberty University School of Law; M.Div., 2002, Southeastern
Baptist Theological Seminary; B.A., 1998, Charleston Southern University.
1. Patricia Ward Biederman and Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS Warning, L.A.
TIMEs, Nov. 7, 2005.
2. Id.
3. Pat McCaughan, Pasadena Congregation to Challenge IRS Summons, Episcopal News
Serv., Sept. 21, 2006.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Letter from Marsha A. Ramirez, Director, EO Examinations, Internal Revenue Service,
to All Saints Church (Sep. 10, 2007), available at http://www.allsaints-
pas.org/site/DocServer/Letter-fromIRS-toAllSaintsChurch.pdf?doclD=-2541 (last visited
Sept. 6, 2008).
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Regas's sermon caused the church to "intervene[] in the 2004 Presidential
election campaign.",8 This intervention did not cost All Saints its tax-exempt
status because the IRS was satisfied the infraction was "a one-time occurrence"
and because the church had "policies in place to ensure that the Church
complies with the prohibition against intervention in campaigns for public
office." 9 The letter warned All Saints to inform guest speakers of these
policies.' The message from the IRS was clear: Don't let it happen again.
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") provides the
criteria for organizations that are eligible for exemption from federal income tax
and to whom tax-deductible contributions may be made. 1 One of the section's
requirements is that exempt organizations, including churches, must not
participate or intervene in a political campaign. 2 The confrontation between
All Saints and the IRS over Regas's anti-war sermon is the latest example of an
administration seeking to enforce the 501 (c)(3) campaign prohibition against a
religious organization that had voiced opposition to the president during his
campaign. ' 3 Aside from questions of retaliatory prosecution that may exist,1 4
this incident illustrates the danger churches face when they publicly denounce
or criticize a candidate for public office. Although only one church has lost its
tax-exempt status because of alleged campaigning,15 the specter of an IRS
investigation and the possible loss of tax exemption chill the speech of many
congregations and religious leaders who otherwise would speak out at election
time. The All Saints incident also demonstrates that this dilemma is not
peculiar to churches of a particular ideology. Churches of all political
persuasions potentially risk their tax-exempt status when they openly address
issues relevant to their faith during a campaign season.
This situation has not escaped the notice of clergy, legal scholars, and
members of Congress. These leaders have proposed several alternatives to
8. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id. at *2.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
12. Id.
13. For other notable examples, see Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849
(10th Cir. 1973) (revocation of tax exempt status for Christian advocacy organization that had
used its publications and broadcasts to criticize John F. Kennedy as being too liberal) and
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (revocation of tax exempt status
for church that had published an advertisement in national newspapers warning Christians that
Bill Clinton held unbiblical stances on issues).
14. The plaintiffs in both Christian Echoes and Rossotti unsuccessfully argued that they
were the subject of arbitrary or selective prosecution.
15. Rossotti, 211 F.3d at 139.
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correct the chilling effect the current tax law has on religious expression.
Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina introduced one such measure in
2005.6 Known as the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act
(hereinafter "Houses of Worship Act" or the "Act"), this amendment to section
501 would protect a church from forfeiting its tax-exempt status based on the
content of a sermon or other presentation in a worship service. 17 While the
Houses of Worship Act would not remedy all the problems faced by churches
in this area, it would ensure that clergy could comment on candidates in the
context of their religious activities without fear of running afoul of tax laws.
This Comment assesses the validity of the 501(c)(3) campaign prohibition as
applied to churches. Section II begins with an overview of the history of
church tax exemptions, followed by a focus on the nature of such exemptions.
This inquiry follows a line of Supreme Court decisions to determine how the
Court has understood religious exemptions and how this understanding affects
the validity of the campaign prohibition as applied to churches. Section III
delves into the text, history, and rationales of the prohibition. Section IV
analyzes the constitutionality of the prohibition as applied to churches under the
First Amendment's Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses.
Finally, Section V considers various alternatives that have been offered to the
current law, with an emphasis on the constitutionality and probable efficacy of
the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act.
II. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF CHURCH TAX EXEMPTION
A. A Historical Sketch of Tax Exemptions for Churches
The tax exemption of churches and other religious groups is not a new
phenomenon. It is an enduring practice that has emerged in different cultures
and time periods for different reasons.'8  For example, many ancient
civilizations exempted their priests from taxation because of fear of reprisal
from the gods or from the people, who held the clergy in high esteem.19 In fact,
this official reverence for the culture's religious leaders sometimes reflected an
16. H.R. 235, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005); see Kelly S. Shoop, If You Area Good Christian You
Have No Business Voting for This Candidate: Church Sponsored Political Activity in Federal
Elections, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 1927, 1943 (2005).
17. Id. As of the date of this writing, the Houses of Worship Act has not been introduced in
the 110th Congress. Section V of this article nonetheless contends that Congress should again
consider the Act because its provisions are more workable and better able to withstand
constitutional scrutiny than other proposals.
18. See John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 522-545 (1992).
19. Id. at 524-29.
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understanding of the respective powers of state and religion. Emperor Cyrus of
Persia "fully understood the first principle of statesmanship-that religion is
stronger than the state... [and] showed a courteous respect for the deities of
the conquered.... ,20 Of course, governments have not always been so
benevolent and fair-minded in their use of the taxing power towards religion.
During the Middle Ages, both Moslem and Christian states heavily taxed
nonadherents, with Jews bearing a disproportionate share of the tax burden in
medieval England.2'
It naturally was the English legal tradition that most heavily influenced
American tax exemptions. 22 This tradition can be traced through the lines of
both common law and equity.23 Under the common law, the 1601 Statute of
Charitable Uses, created to enforce charitable trusts, provided the first working
definition of charity.24 The Statute did not list religion as a charitable use,
likely out of concern that property donated to a religion deemed "superstitious"
by the reigning state church might be confiscated, thus thwarting the purpose of
the donor.25 Laterjudicial decisions, however, confirmed that the advancement
26of religion was a valid purpose for charitable trusts. In fact, religious uses
were later considered one of "the four principal divisions of charity in English
law., 27 These common law definitions of charity, which included religion,
heavily influenced American tax law. Chief Justice Warren Burger observed
that "the form and history of the charitable exemption and deduction sections of
the various income tax Acts reveal that Congress was guided by the common
law of charitable trusts. 28
Similarly, under English laws of equity, churches enjoyed property tax
exemptions because of their charitable use of such property.2 9 While the
common law simply included the advancement of religion within its definition
of charity, equity focused on the benefits actually conferred by a church's
activities to determine whether its property use was charitable. 30 The rationale
20. Id. at 527 (quoting W. DutRANT, OUR OErrAL HERITAGE 353 (1954)).
21. Id. at 529-30.
22. Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of
Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 145, 149 (2006).
23. Id. at 147.
24. Id. at 148 (The author notes that the preamble to the Statute of Uses strongly influenced
the Internal Revenue Code's understanding of charitable organizations).
25. Whitehead, supra note 18, at 533.
26. Id.
27. Kenmitt, supra note 22, at 149.
28. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983).
29. Whitehead, supra note 18, at 535.
30. Id.
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for the exemption was based upon the churches' involvement in beneficent
social endeavors rather than upon their religious character. 3' Institutions
deemed charitable received equitable privileges such as tax exemptions and
subsidies, and government workers conducted annual inspections to determine
the amount of such privileges.32 Poorer charities generally received less aid
than their wealthy counterparts.33
Favorable tax treatment of churches continued in the American colonies but
in a much different setting than exists today. Nine of the thirteen original
colonies had established churches. 34 In those colonies, the established churches
received government aid, either through subsidies or tax exemptions; other
religions were taxed.35 A disestablishment trend began with the Revolution and
continued up until the ratification of the Constitution.36 Even so, church tax
exemptions persevered as the states, beginning with Pennsylvania, adopted
measures that protected church property from taxation.37
Throughout its history, the federal government also has made provisions for
church tax exemption. In the early 1800s, these provisions included an
exemption from a taxing statute in Alexandria County, Virginia, a refund of
duties paid by religious groups on the importation of religious articles, and an
38
exemption of church property from a federal tax on household furniture.
Later in that century, Congress exempted "religious associations" from a lottery
tax and churches from a District of Columbia property tax. 39 In 1894, the
Wilson Tariff Act excluded "corporations, companies, or associations
organized and conducted solely for.., religious ... purposes. ' 4° Following the
Sixteenth Amendment's provision for a federal income tax, Congress passed
the Revenue Act of 1913, the foundation of the current tax system. That Act
included an exemption for charitable organizations (including churches) that
has been part of every edition of the tax code since then.41
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Kemmitt, supra note 22, at 149.
35. Whitehead, supra note 18, at 536.
36. Kemmitt, supra note 22, at 150.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Whitehead, supra note 18, at 541-42.
40. Kemmitt, supra note 22, at 150.
41. Whitehead, supra note 18, at 542.
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B. The Nature of Church Tax Exemption: A Matter of Subsidy,
Sovereignty, or Separation?
In light of its venerable history, is church tax exemption best understood (1)
as a government subsidy, (2) as respect for churches' sectarian sovereignty, or
(3) as a measure necessary to prevent excessive entanglement between the state
and the church? Professor Edward A. Zelinsky proposes these three paradigms
for viewing church tax exemptions, with a particular focus on whether tax
benefits for religious institutions are dependent on similar benefits for secular
entities.42 The paradigms are also instructive in determining whether Congress
may legitimately condition income tax exemptions on churches' non-
participation in political campaigns. If exemption is a subsidy, Congress has
the authority to withhold financial assistance from churches involved in
campaigning. If exemption is a recognition of church sovereignty and thus a
definition of the appropriate tax base, the campaign prohibition is
impermissible because Congress lacks the authority to tax churches in the first
place. If exemption is a means of avoiding entanglement between church and
state, the prohibition is invalid because it actually fosters such entanglement.
These paradigms offer insightful and unique ways of viewing church tax
exemptions. The sovereignty and separation paradigms are useful as possible
normative arguments on why churches should be exempt from otherwise
generally applicable taxes. None of Zelinsky's paradigms, however, adequately
reflect the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the relationship between churches
and the taxing power. This Section suggests a fourth paradigm. Although this
paradigm does not provide a rationale for all church tax exemptions, it is
faithful to current constitutional jurisprudence and explains why the 501 (c)(3)
campaign prohibition violates the nature of the exemptions.
The fourth paradigm suggests that church tax exemptions are mandated only
when church activity is protected by the First Amendment. This understanding
reflects the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area. Under
this view, the campaign prohibition places an impermissible dilemma on
churches; they must either surrender their federal tax exemption or their rights
to free speech and free exercise. Moreover, the political cannot genuinely be
separated from the spiritual in religious worship. Removing the 501(c)(3)
prohibition from churches will not subsidize their speech but provide a
constitutionally-mandated protection for their First Amendment rights.
42. Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits "for Religious Institutions Constitutionally
Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 805, 808-12 (2001).
[Vol. 2:557
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Zelinsky argues that, as a normative matter, church tax benefits should not
depend on similar benefits being extended to secular organizations.4 3 He
believes that "it is most compelling to conceive of religious tax exemptions as
the acknowledgement of sectarian sovereignty."" The basic idea is that because
churches enjoy autonomy in their ecclesiastical affairs, they should be treated as
non-taxable entities. Because secular organizations do not possess this
sovereignty, they are not entitled to be excluded from the tax base. Zelinsky
admits that the sovereignty paradigm does not comport with current Supreme
Court jurisprudence.45 Yet he does point to the 1940s cases of Murdock v.
Pennsylvania4 6 and Follett v. Town of McCormick47 as indicative of that
48viewpoint.
In Murdock, the Court struck down a city ordinance requiring a business
license (and accompanying tax) for traveling salespersons as it applied to
Jehovah's Witnesses who distributed religious materials in exchange for
donations.49 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, described the fee as "a
license tax-a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill
of Rights." 50 This is impermissible, the Court held, because "[a] State may not
impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal
constitution.",51 The right in question was (at least in part) the right to the free
exercise of religion, "[a] privilege [which] exists apart from state
[sovereignty]. 52 Thus, the Court concluded that the free exercise of one's
religion is an activity beyond the taxing authority of the state; it echoed the
familiar theme that "[t]he power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power
to control or suppress its enjoyment" and that the city had no authority to
suppress First Amendment rights by means of a license tax.53
The following year, the Court confronted a nearly identical fact pattern in
Follett v. Town of McCormick; the only difference was that the plaintiff was a
local resident who earned his living selling religious books rather than an
itinerant evangelist who incidentally sold such materials. 54 The Court found the
43. Id. at 807.
44. Id. at 841.
45. Id. at 834-35.
46. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
47. 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
48. Zelinsky, supra note 42, at 835.
49. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1943).
50. Id. at 113.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 115.
53. Id. at 112.
54. Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573, 574-75 (1944).
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distinction constitutionally insignificant, noting that the problem in both
Murdock and Follett was the exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of
First Amendment rights." Justice Douglas again wrote for the majority and
compared the tax to censorship or a prior restraint, stating: "[T]o say that
[preachers and parishioners] like other citizens may be subject to general
taxation does not mean that they can be required to pay a tax for the exercise of
that which the First Amendment has made a high constitutional privilege.,
56
Although the Murdock and Follett opinions did not extensively analyze the
government taxing authority vis-A-vis religious groups, the Court in both cases
found that requiring a citizen to pay a tax for the privilege of religious exercise
operated as a prior restraint and an undue burden under the First Amendment.57
These holdings were premised on the assumption that the religious speech in
question was not taxable at all. Justice Douglas made clear that the result did
not turn on the amount of the tax or the burden it placed on the particular
speakers. 58 Douglas emphasized that to inquire whether the tax in question
actually controlled or suppressed speech is to disregard the nature of the tax; he
admonished: "[I]t may not be said that proof is lacking that these license taxes
either separately or cumulatively have restricted or are likely to restrict
petitioners' religious activities. On their face they are a restriction of the free
exercise of those freedoms which are protected by the First Amendment.
59
Professor Zelinsky characterizes the exemptions in Murdock and Follett as
"judicially-created" based on the Court's understanding of the First
Amendment, and he opines that the exemptions were "exclusively for religious
activity.'6° It is true that the exemptions were judicially imposed in the sense
that they were provided only as the result of the Court's holdings. They were
created, however, by the Constitution, and it is not at all certain that the
holdings apply only to religious speech. The Murdock opinion, for example,
several times described the right at issue as also involving freedom of the
press. 61 If the plaintiffs in those cases had been distributing political treatises in
exchange for contributions, they still would have prevailed; Justice Douglas
strongly suggested this when he reminded readers "that the pamphlets of
Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge.
'6 2
55. Id. at 577.
56. Id. at 577-78.
57. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943); Follett, 321 U.S. at 577.
58. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112-13.
59. Id. at 113-14.
60. Zelinsky, supra note 42, at 813.
61. Murdock, 319U.S. at 114-15, 117.
62. Id. at 111.
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It is unclear whether Professor Zelinsky interprets these cases as a pure
sovereignty issue or primarily an issue of entanglement.63 The fact that the
exemption likely would have been available to non-religious actors is crucial
because it becomes difficult to interpret the Murdock and Follett cases as
recognizing sectarian sovereignty as the source of the tax exemption. It is
likewise difficult to see how the entanglement theory applies to these cases
because their rationale would apply to First Amendment situations that do not
involve religious exercise. Either way, Zelinsky argues that these cases view
exemptions not as subsidies but as dependent on the appropriate tax baseline.
This general approach is faithful to the cases; it is clear that the majority
opinions did not treat exemption as a subsidy. The majority in both Murdock
and Follett contrasted their holdings with the concerns of the dissenters, who
feared the Court was merely underwriting religious activity. Justice Reed, in
his Follett concurrence, took pains to note that the exemptions would not act to
subsidize religion but would "give substance to the constitutional right of
religious freedom." 64
Thus, it appears that none of Zelinsky's three paradigms adequately address
these decisions. The problem with the city license taxes was not that they
interfered with sectarian sovereignty; indeed, the Court carefully distinguished
the taxes in question from a generally applicable income or property tax, which
could properly be assessed against a preacher or church.65 It was not that the
taxes engendered excessive entanglement with religion; their vice was that they
acted as a prior restraint (which would be impermissible with any First
Amendment activity).66  And the Court certainly did not view the
constitutionally mandated exemptions as subsidies.
A fourth paradigm is needed. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirm
that none of Zelinsky's three approaches can adequately provide a consistent
understanding of church tax exemptions. No Supreme Court decision has
adopted the sovereignty paradigm as mandating exemptions for churches. It is
questionable whether the entanglement paradigm can mandate an exemption; it
is possible that it could do so where a tax is so onerous or difficult to enforce
63. See Zelinsky, supra note 42, at 835 (stating that Murdock and Follett "indicate that
exemption is constitutionally compelled for sectarian entities and undertakings when taxation
intrudes too deeply upon the autonomy of religion") and at 813-14 (noting that Murdock and
Follett reasoned in terms of entanglement).
64. Follett, 321 U.S. at 579.
65. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943); Follett v. Town of McCormick,
S.C., 321 U.S. 573, 577-78 (1944).
66. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 114; Follett, 321 U.S. at 577.
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that it necessitates excessive government intrusion into church matters,67 but the
Court has yet to find a case where that applies. The subsidy paradigm under
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence would never mandate an
exemption; it could only strike an exemption down.
Therefore, it is best to say that tax exemptions are mandatory where the tax
would infringe on the religious organization's First Amendment rights. In that
respect, the Constitution demands the exemption. The "exemption" is merely
an outcome required by the Bill of Rights-an outworking of free speech and
free exercise principles. In this sense, one could argue that it is a matter of
sovereignty, but the cases do not treat it as such. It is not that the church qua
church is tax-exempt. It is that a tax is invalid as applied to a church insomuch
as it abridges the church's First Amendment privileges.
Dean Herbert W. Titus argues that the free-exercise principle must
"absolutely protect religion from the taxing power of the state." 68 Titus points
to James Madison's definition of religion as "the duty that we owe to our
Creator" and states that "religion is an unalienable right that man may neither
give away nor take from another."69  He notes that religious duties are
objectively detached from civil jurisdiction, making "the propagation of
$170opinions, religious and secular .... free from the state's taxing power ....
From this understanding, sovereignty is bound up within the nature of church
activity. Religion is "sovereign" in the sense that it is an objective duty that can
neither be encouraged nor suppressed by civil government. Thus, religion is
sovereign to the extent that it consists of a First Amendment right, a thing
against which the Constitution (by recognition of the natural right) has
circumscribed the government's authority to act. Under this paradigm, the
501 (c)(3) campaign prohibition is against the nature of exemption because it
attempts to suppress fundamentally religious speech.
Later Supreme Court cases bear out this understanding of the exemption. In
Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court, in an 8-1 decision, upheld the
constitutionality of church property tax exemptions in New York City.7' In that
case, the petitioner, an owner of real estate within the tax commission's
jurisdiction, sought an injunction preventing the commission to grant
67. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Calif., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990)
(noting that "it is of course possible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate, even if generally
applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices").
68. Herbert W. Titus, No Taxation or Subsidization: Two Indispensable Principles of
Freedom of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 505, 516 (1992).
69. Id. at 517.
70. Id. at 519.
71. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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exemptions to religious organizations for properties used exclusively for
religious worship.72 The petitioner's argument was that the exemption in
essence required him to make a contribution to the exempted religious groups
in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.7 3
The Court rejected the petitioner's challenge on the grounds that a property
tax exemption neither advances nor inhibits religion but is instead a "reasonable
and balanced attempt to guard against [the] dangers" of government hostility
towards religion. 74  Justice Burger's majority opinion reflected a non-
entanglement stance; he recognized that either taxing or exempting churches
would lead to some level of involvement between church and state.7 5 He
concluded that in either case the question is one of degree, and that exemption
is less intrusive than taxation.76
Professor Zelinsky notes that the entanglement analysis employed in Walz is
qualitatively different from that used in Murdock and Follett.7 In those earlier
cases, Justice Douglas found tax exemption to be constitutionally required,
while Justice Burger in Walz simply finds that exemption is constitutionally
permissible.78 Zelinsky interprets the differences as owing to the relative
degrees of entanglement theory applied; he sees Douglas as using a stronger
form of the theory and Burger employing a weaker strain.79 The differences
among the cases, however, are clearer from a First Amendment perspective. In
Murdock and Follett, the taxes were applied directly to a religious practice, and
an exemption was necessary to preserve the free press and free exercise
privileges at stake. In Walz, the exemption was from a property tax that was
not levied against any particular expressive activity, religious or otherwise.
Burger found that the exemption was permissible because it did not excessively
enmesh the state in religious affairs, or vice versa. Thus, Murdock and Follett
utilize a First Amendment paradigm, while Walz is best understood in terms of
entanglement.
The concurrences of Justices Brennan and Harlan in Walz have had a more
enduring effect than has the majority opinion. 80 These Justices upheld the
property exemptions to churches because they were part of a broader exemption
72. Id. at 666.
73. Id. at 667.
74. Id. at 673.
75. Id. at 674.
76. Id. at 674-75.
77. Zelinsky, supra note 42, at 817.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 835.
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scheme that included other nonprofit organizations which promoted community
welfare. 81 The fact that the tax commission had a broad scheme of which
churches were only a part indicated a secular purpose.
What is clear from both the majority and concurrences in Walz is that they
did not view exemption as a subsidy. Justice Burger explicitly stated: "The
grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not
transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that
the church support the state."82 Justice Brennan also emphasized that "[t]ax
exemptions and general subsidies.., are qualitatively different. 83 The former
relieves an entity from the burden of supporting the government while the latter
involves the direct transfer of public money to private enterprise. 84 This type of
entanglement/accommodation theory, like sovereignty theory, views
exemptions as part of the tax base definition.
Justice Burger's view of exemption as an exclusion from the tax base would
soon be chipped away. In 1983, the Court decided Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington, in which it held that the 501 (c)(3) prohibition
on substantial lobbying by nonprofit groups did not violate the Free Speech
Clause.85 Justice Rehnquist clearly stated that tax exemptions are "a form of
subsidy that is administered through the tax system.... [with] much the same
effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to
pay on its income. ' 86 Rehnquist applied the subsidy theory in determining that
Congress simply "chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to
subsidize other activities that non profit organizations undertake to promote the
public welfare."
87
During the same term as Regan, the Court decided the more famous case of
Bob Jones University v. United States, in which it upheld the revocation of tax-
exempt status for two private Christian schools that employed racial criteria in
their admissions policies. 88 Justice Burger stated that the rationale behind
exemptions for non-profit organizations focuses on the public benefits the
organizations provide; they are not taxed because they provide a benefit which
the community is unwilling or unable to provide or "which supplements and
81. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970).
82. Id. at 675.
83. Id. at 690.
84. Id. at 690-91.
85. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
86. Id. at 544.
87. Id.
88. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues. 89
Because the non-profit charities are, in Burger's reasoning, social agents of the
state, they are allowed exemptions even though the exemptions act as indirect
donations by other taxpayers. 90
Several years later, the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock struck down
on Establishment Clause grounds a sales tax exemption provided only for
religious periodicals. 9' Justice Brennan authored the majority opinion and, for
the most part, adopted the same type of reasoning he employed in Walz. Just as
he had upheld the property tax exemption in Walz because it extended to a
broader class that included secular beneficiaries, Brennan ruled against the
Texas exemption because it applied only to religious publications.92 It thus
lacked a valid secular purpose and had the effect of endorsing religion, Brennan
concluded.93
Contrary to his concurrence in Walz, however, Brennan made the striking
statement that "[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects
nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become 'indirect and vicarious'
donors." 94 Yet it is important to note that even a subsidy theory cannot justify
all tax burdens on religious entities. Brennan implied that there exist situations
where the Free Exercise Clause requires a subsidy, such as when it removes "a
significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion ....
The following year, the Court decided Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization,96 where it held that the application of a sales and use tax to a
religious organization did not violate the Free Exercise or Establishment
Clauses.97 The ministry argued that the Murdock and Follett decisions stood
for the proposition that a state may not apply a sales or use tax to the
distribution of evangelical materials. 98  Justice O'Connor, writing for a
unanimous Court, disagreed, noting that those cases involved "flat license taxes
that operated as a prior restraint on the exercise of religious liberty."
99
O'Connor then held that the concern present in those cases does not exist where
a tax has general application and is not imposed as a precondition to expressive
89. Id. at 591.
90. Id.
91. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
92. Id. at 14-15.
93. Id. at 14-16.
94. Id. at 14 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)).
95. Id. at 15.
96. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
97. Id. at 378.
98. Id. at 385.
99. Id. at 386.
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activity.1°° The Court also rejected the ministry's contention that the tax
imposed a substantial burden on its free exercise of religion.' 0 ' O'Connor
stated that a burden is not constitutionally significant merely because it reduces
the amount of money an organization has to spend on its religious activities.10 2
Neither did the tax violate the Establishment Clause, the Court held, because
it did not foster excessive entanglement with religion. "The sorts of
government entanglement that we have found to violate the Establishment
Clause," O'Connor observed, "have been far more invasive than the level of
contact created by the administration of neutral tax laws.' 1 3 Thus, the Court
did not find any applicable rationale-including the First Amendment
paradigm-that would mandate a sales/use tax exemption for religious
materials.
If these cases can be harmonized at all, the trend seems to be this: the
Supreme Court has made the subtle but important distinction between viewing
a tax exemption as passively declining to place a burden on an entity and as
affirmatively granting a benefit to that entity. The Court's more recent
decisions in this area adopt the view that exemption is a subsidy. Because
exemption is a subsidy, it is never mandated (except perhaps in the rare
situation where the application of a tax would impose a prior restraint on First
Amendment activity). The Constitution does not require Congress to pay for
private activity. Further, in keeping with the subsidy theory, exemptions for
religious entities are impermissible unless they are part of a broader exemption
scheme that includes secular groups. In light of this trend, the 501(c)(3)
provisions, including the campaign prohibition, merely establish the terms by
which Congress is willing to subsidize charitable organizations. Unless the
prohibition imposes the type of First Amendment burden found in Murdock and
Follett, it is consistent with the Court's understanding of exemptions. Section
IV examines the validity of the prohibition under the First Amendment.
III. THE 501 (C)(3) ELECTIONEERING PROHIBITION: ITS HISTORY,
RATIONALE, AND CHILLING EFFECT
The ban on non-profit campaigning did not find its way into the tax code
until 1954, when Senator Lyndon B. Johnson offered it as a floor
amendment."°4 It passed without debate, a hearing, or any other form of
100. Id. at 390.
101. Id. at 390-91.
102. Id. at 391.
103. Id. at 395-96.
104. 100 Cong. Rec. 9604 (1954).
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legislative history.10 5  The prevailing theory seems to be that Johnson
introduced the amendment out of frustration over an opponent's receipt of
contributions from a charitable fund during Johnson's previous election
campaign.' ° 6  Another theory is that Johnson was concerned about
organizations with communist views receiving federal tax exemptions.'
0 7
Whatever his motive, Johnson's purpose likely was not to limit the political
activities of churches, as he himself took advantage of church support.
10 8
Regardless, the legislative record provides scant evidence of any rationale
behind the restriction.
As it now stands, Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts
the following types of organizations from taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes.., no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial
part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting to influence legislation (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office. 109
This section grants exemption from the federal income tax; donations to
organizations that qualify under this section are deductible. 10 This ability to
105. Id. See Shawn A. Voyles, Choosing Between Tax-Exempt Status and Freedom of
Religion: The Dilemma Facing Politically-Active Churches, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 219, 234
(1997); Scott W. Putney, The IRC's Prohibition of Political Campaigning by Churches and the
Establishment Clause, 64-MAY FLA. B.J. 27,28 (1990); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and the
Pulpit: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious
Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 880-881 (2001).
106. Johnson, supra note 105, at 880-81.
107. Kemmitt, supra note 22, at 153.
108. Id. Also, one commentator notes that the Majority Report for the bill including Senator
Johnson's amendment stated: "The right of a minister, priest or rabbi to engage in political
activity is clear enough. When such activity takes place, however, under the shelter of a tax-
exempt organization which is not in itself a church, we question its permissibility." Allan J.
Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 145, 157 (2007).
109. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
110. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2000).
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 571 2007-2008
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
attract tax-deductible donations is extremely valuable for many non-profits as
the benefit of deductibility greatly helps them in gathering donors."'
Section 501(c)(3) establishes four major requirements that organizations
must meet to qualify for the tax exemption. 12 First, the non-profit must be
organized and operated exclusively for one of the enumerated charitable
purposes. 113 Religion has been considered a valid charitable use since the days
of the common law and is one of the qualifying purposes."14 Second, no part of
the organization's earnings may inure to the benefit of a stockholder or any
other individual. "5 The rationale behind this requirement is obvious: Congress
did not establish the exemption as a means for people to channel or generate
personal income through a tax-free entity. Third, no substantial part of the
organization's activity can consist of lobbying. 1 6 This requirement was
inserted in 1934 by Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania as a measure to restrict
charitable donations "made to advance the personal interests of the giver of the
money . . ,.1. Fourth, the organization is absolutely prohibited from
participating or intervening in any political campaign for public office."
18
Several rationales have been offered for the 501 (c)(3) campaign prohibition.
The major rationale suggested is that Congress has made a determination not to
subsidize non-profit political activity. 19 This explanation appeared when
Congress, in amending 501(c) in 1987 as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act ("OBRA"), declared the policy that "the U.S. Treasury
should be neutral in political affairs.' 120 A related justification that has been
offered is that Congress has an interest in ensuring that non-profits do not
become a "loophole" by which otherwise non-deductible donations become
deductible.'1
2
These rationales are not strong enough to justify keeping the prohibition as it
is. Given the venerable history of church tax exemption and church political
involvement, an absolute ban with no legislative history and no official
explanation (except one mentioned in passing several decades later) should be
replaced with a more thoughtful provision. Also, the campaign prohibition is
111. Voyles, supra note 105, at 222.
112. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
113. Id.
114. See Whitehead, supra note 18, at 533.
115. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
116. Id.
117. Johnson, supra note 105, at 880.
118. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
119. Johnson, supra note 105, at 890-93.
120. Voyles, supra note 105, at 234-35.
121. Johnson, supra note 105, at 893.
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not sufficiently tailored to accomplish the Congressional purpose of avoiding
loopholes. As Steffen N. Johnson points out, the deductibility issue is a lesser
concern "where a minister merely speaks about the moral qualifications of
candidates as part of regularly scheduled worship services. 122 He is
undoubtedly correct in noting that "not all types of restricted political activity
pose the same threat" to the integrity of the tax scheme.
123
Churches are concerned about the prohibition because it has a chilling effect
on their speech. As the late pastor Dr. D. James Kennedy put it, the rule
"effectively silence[s]" clergy who, feeling compelled to speak on political
subjects for conscience's sake, remain silent for fear of jeopardizing their
ministries' 501(c)(3) status. 124 Some might argue that religious leaders should
quit worrying so much about the financial constraints associated with a lack of
501(c)(3) designation and instead should speak their consciences without
concern for tax consequences. Although that may be sound spiritual advice, it
does not address the issue of whether Congress is legally justified in
conditioning tax exemption on a church's self-censorship.
Others might insist that churches oppose the prohibition because these
objecting congregations feel the balance of political power currently is in their
favor. Under this view, churches actually would favor the ban if some
dominant religious group were using an exemption to preach a message
antithetical to their own. As the investigation into All Saints Episcopal Church
illustrates, however, this is not an issue championed within one denomination
or ideological circle. Leaders of many religions and political persuasions have
come to the defense of All Saints-a politically liberal, mainline Protestant
church. 125 Moreover, history illustrates that the IRS under both Republican and
Democratic administrations has pursued churches for 501 (c)(3) violations after
those churches opposed the President during his campaign. 126 The push by
churches to remove the campaign prohibition is not designed to enhance the
122. Id. at 894.
123. Id.
124. Letter from D. James Kennedy, Ph.D. to Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina
(Sep. 20, 2001), available at 145 CONG. REc. H6246 (daily ed. Sep. 12, 2002).
125. Louis Sahagun, Church Votes to Fight Federal Probe, L.A. TIVES, Sept. 22, 2006, at
BI.
126. See Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1973) (revocation
of tax exempt status for Christian advocacy organization that had used its publications and
broadcasts to criticize John F. Kennedy as being too liberal); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211
F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (revocation of tax exempt status for church that had published an
advertisement in national newspapers warning Christians that Bill Clinton held unbiblical
stances on issues).
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political power of one party or faith but to allow all religious groups to preach
freely during election seasons without fear of reprisal from the IRS.
The history and proffered rationales of the current 501(c)(3) campaign
prohibition demonstrate that it is an ill-conceived measure with an unintended
impact on churches' freedom of worship. Not only is the limitation poor policy,
there are serious questions about its constitutionality.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 501 (c)(3) ELECTIONEERING PROHIBITION
As APPLIED TO CHURCHES
A. Free Speech
One constitutional argument against the prohibition is that it violates the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause by conditioning an organization's
receipt of a government benefit on the surrender of its right to speak out on
political issues. In Speiser v. Randall, the Supreme Court examined
Califomia's denial of tax benefits to veterans who would not foreswear
advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government.127 Justice Brennan found
that this was an impermissible content-based restriction: "To deny an
exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State
were to fine them for the speech. ' l 8
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,129 the Court
declined to apply the Speiser rationale to the denial of tax exemption for an
organization that would be substantially engaged in lobbying.1 30 Justice
Rehnquist stated that that case did not fit the Speiser model because Congress
in 501(c)(3) simply decided not to subsidize lobbyists. 131 Rehnquist seemed to
argue that lobbying is an activity not included within the enumerated charitable
purposes. In other words, Rehnquist viewed the case not as Congress's
conditioning tax exemption on groups' promises not to lobby but as a definition
of the tax base that excluded lobbying organizations. This distinction between
Speiser and Regan is quite ephemeral; it assumes one can distinguish a
government benefit conditioned on the surrender of a First Amendment right
from a government benefit denied to those who exercise that right.
The 501(c)(3) campaign prohibition is a content-based restriction that fits
within the Speiser model. The prohibition is absolute; an exempt organization
127. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
128. Id. at 518.
129. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
130. Id. at 540.
131. Id. at 545-46.
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that is deemed to have intervened or participated in a political campaign is
disqualified. Based on the IRS and courts' interpretation of the prohibition, a
church would violate 501(c)(3) and lose its tax-exempt status if the pastor
preached a sermon about the moral failings of a political candidate or if he
warned parishioners that it could be a sin to vote for that candidate. On the
other hand, if that same pastor used non-political illustrations to make a point
about moral decay in contemporary culture, the church clearly would remain
exempt. Thus, a church's continued eligibility for the tax exemption depends
on the content of its speech. Such a content-based restriction passes
constitutional muster only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, the prohibition is valid only if it is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling governmental interest. It is possible that preserving the
integrity of the tax code is a sufficiently compelling interest. The prohibition,
however, is not narrowly tailored. In fact, it is about as extreme as it possibly
could be. As mentioned previously, any statement or act deemed to be
intervention or participation in a campaign is grounds for revocation of
exemption. There exists a multitude of less restrictive means Congress could
adopt to accomplish its purpose of preventing campaign donors from using
non-profits as a vehicle for getting tax deductions.
B. Free Exercise
A second possible constitutional argument against the prohibition is that it
violates churches' right to free exercise of religion. Religious organizations
have not been successful in the few cases that have dealt with this issue. In
Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, an evangelistic
organization contested the propriety of its tax exemption revocation.'3 2 The
IRS revoked the ministry's exempt status because it determined that the
organization was involved in substantial lobbying activities, in violation of the
501(c)(3) limitation. 133 Christian Echoes argued that the withdrawal of its tax
exemption was an infringement of its First Amendment free exercise rights. 1
34
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, largely
because it viewed tax exemptions as a matter of legislative grace rather than of
right.' 35 The court saw no problem with the choice Christian Echoes had
between enjoying the exemption and pursuing its lobbying activities., 36
132. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 849.
133. Id. at 853.
134. Id. at 856.
135. Id. at 857.
136. Id.
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Moreover, the court found that the government had a compelling interest in
enforcing the restriction: "That of guarantying that the wall separating church
and state remain high and firm.' 37 Although the Christian Echoes case
involved the lobbying restriction rather than the campaign prohibition, its
rationale could just as easily apply to the campaigning issue, provided that one
accepts the court's assumptions: namely, that it is permissible to force religious
groups to choose between free speech and tax exemption and that separation of
church and state is a compelling interest.
The only case that has directly applied the Free Exercise clause to the
revocation of a church tax exemption because of political campaigning is
Branch Ministries v. Rossotti from the District of Columbia Circuit.' 38 On
October 30, 1992, four days before the presidential election, the Church at
Pierce Creek in Binghamton, New York placed a frill-page advertisement in
major American newspapers warning Christians of then-Govemor Bill
Clinton's views on controversial social issues such as abortion, homosexuality,
and the distribution of condoms to teenage students. 39 The headline of the
advertisement, "Christians Beware," indicated its tone, and the advertisement's
message intimated that it would be sinful for believers to vote for Clinton.
140
The newspaper ad prompted the IRS to review and later revoke the church's
tax-exempt status because it alleged the publication of these anti-Clinton
sentiments constituted prohibited intervention in a political campaign.'14
The church filed suit, claiming, among other things, that the revocation
violated its right to the free exercise of religion.142 The circuit court held that
the church failed to show how the revocation substantially burdened its
religious exercise. 43 The court was not impressed with the church's argument
that conditioning exemption on non-participation in political campaigns was
itself an unconstitutional burden. Senior Circuit Judge Buckley wrote:
The Church appears to assume that the withdrawal of a conditional
privilege for failure to meet the condition is in itself an
unconstitutional burden on its free exercise right. This is true,
however, only if the receipt of the privilege (in this case the tax
exemption) is conditioned "upon conduct proscribed by a religious
faith, or... denie[d]... because of conduct mandated by religious
137. Id.
138. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 140.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 140-41.
143. Id. at 142.
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belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs."
' 144
The court did not find such an instance with the Church at Pierce Creek
because the church did not "maintain that a withdrawal from electoral politics
would violate its beliefs.' 45 The court further held that a loss of financial
revenues due to the lack of exemption does not rise to the level of a
"constitutionally significant" burden. 46
The Rossotti court did not consider the Murdock/Follett or Speiser First
Amendment theories. Under the Murdock/Follett theory, religious expression
is not taxable in the first place. Under the Speiser theory, the state cannot
condition a benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right. The condition
imposes aper se burden. According to Rossotti, a state can hold out the carrot
of tax exemption to churches who give up their right to speak on political
candidates; alternatively, it may wield the stick of revocation if a church goes
too far with its criticism or praise of political actors.
Yet the political cannot be neatly sifted from the religious in church doctrine
and corporate worship. As one commentator puts it: "Many churches, perhaps
most, consider it part of their mission to speak out and instruct on matters of
public policy and morality. Undoubtedly some consider issues involving public
policy-whether a position on abortion, going to war, or helping the
underprivileged-among their most important tenets.', 147 Because a church's
application of Scriptural truths and moral codes, and indeed its social
conscience, may require it to take a stand on issues espoused by candidates or
even the candidates themselves, it is a substantial burden to demand that a
church sacrifice that component of its religious exercise.
C. Establishment Clause
A third constitutional argument against the campaign prohibition is that it
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... ,,148
The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test to determine whether a law
violates the Establishment Clause: first, the law must have a secular purpose;
second, the law must have the primary effect of neither advancing or inhibiting
144. Id. (quoting Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Calif., 493 U.S. 378,
391-92 (1990)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Samansky, supra note 108, at 150-51.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 577 2007-2008
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
religion; third, the law must not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion. 49 A statute in violation of any one of these prongs is
unconstitutional. 150
It is difficult to argue that the campaign prohibition, within the larger context
of 501(c)(3), lacks a secular purpose. The section mentions religion only to
indicate that entities organized for religious purposes qualify for the exemption.
The campaign prohibition, like all other provisions of the section, applies
equally to religious and secular organizations. Scott W. Putney argues that the
prohibition's purpose is to stifle disfavored political expression.151 He also
points to Murdock and Follett for the proposition that government cannot use
the taxing power as a means of censorship.
52
Putney's arguments on these points are ill-founded. Because there is no
legislative history for the Senate floor amendment that inserted the campaign
prohibition, Putney relies on historical theories about Senator Lyndon
Johnson's personal motives for proposing the amendment.'53 Putney seems to
reason that: (1) Johnson's motive was to suppress opponents' speech, including
expression from dissenting religious groups; (2) his motive was imputed to the
rest of Congress in passing the bill; and (3) this Congressional purpose is not
secular because of its application to churches. The flaws in this reasoning are
evident. Even if Johnson's personal agenda was to hamstring his political
opponents, a theory that is not universally accepted, 5 4 his motivation cannot be
attributed to every Congressperson who voted for the measure. More
importantly, the fact that the amendment was designed to limit political
expression by exempt groups would be a violation of the Free Speech Clause,
not the Establishment Clause. Although the prohibition has been applied to
ministries and churches, it has also been applied to secular organizations.
Similarly, Putney' s reliance on Murdock and Follett is misplaced. The Court
in those cases struck down city ordinances as applied to religious canvassers
because they acted as prior restraints in violation of the colporteurs' right to the
free exercise of their religion. The Court never suggested that the ordinances
themselves lacked a secular purpose. In sum, Putney rightly critiques the policy
rationales of the campaign prohibition, but to say that a law is misguided does
not mean that its purpose is not secular.
149. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
150. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
151. Putney, supra note 105, at 28.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Kemmitt, supra note 22, at 153.
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Putney next argues that the prohibition has the primary effect of both
advancing and inhibiting religion. 5 5 He contends that the bar against church
campaigning actually advances the "religion of secularism" while inhibiting
other types of religious expression. 156 Quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, Putney observes that "affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion" is tantamount to establishing the
religion of secularism. 157 Many churches refrain from political activity for fear
of losing their tax-exempt status, thus secularizing the political arena to some
degree. The prohibition, however, does not "affirmatively oppose" or "show
hostility" to churches; it simply applies to them as well as every other
organization exempt under 501(c)(3). Just as it is true that the prohibition has
the practical effect of discouraging religious speech on political matters, it is
just as likely that it stifles political speech from tax-exempt, anti-religious
groups. As noted earlier, this effect on speech is unconstitutional in other ways,
but it cannot be said to have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.
Putney makes his strongest arguments when he states that the prohibition
fosters excessive entanglement with religion. 158 In articulating its Establishment
Clause test, the Court in Lemon held that a law fosters such entanglement if it
requires "a comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" to
ensure compliance. 59 Putney notes two major ways in which the campaign
prohibition constitutes impermissible government oversight of the church.
First, it requires IRS agents to distinguish political speech from genuine
religious speech, a task that is beyond the authority and competence of civil
government. 60  A religious leader has the duty to call public figures to
accountability and to admonish parishioners of the spiritual consequences of
their civic involvement.'6 ' This religious calling cannot be neatly separated
from what auditors might consider campaign activity.
155. Putney, supra note 105, at 29.
156. Id. at 29-30.
157. Id. (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963)).
158. Id. at 30.
159. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
160. Putney, supra note 105, at 30.
161. Professor Wyatt McDowell said it well: "The church's very capacity to be the church, to
be faithful to its moral traditions and sense of mission requires an engagement with society that
may be threatened by extreme or discriminatory application of [IRS] lobbying or campaign
regulations." Wyatt McDowell, How Religious Organizations and Churches Can Be Politically
Correct, 42 BRANDEIs L.J. 71 (2003).
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Second, the supervision necessary to determine whether a church has
violated the prohibition is too intrusive. 162 Enforcement of the prohibition
against churches necessarily requires governmental inquiry into the content of
worship services, sermons, and religious publications. The Supreme Court has
cautioned: "'[P]ervasive monitoring' for 'the subtle or overt presence of
religious matter' is a central danger against which we have held the
Establishment Clause guards."' 63 The natural corollary of that principle is that
attempting to filter the political from the religious in the context of church
practice is equally offensive to the First Amendment. Government oversight
that necessitates inquiry into religious doctrine or "detailed monitoring and
close administrative contact" between the state and the church runs afoul of the
nonestablishment principle. 164 Due to the high degree of entanglement it
fosters, Putney persuasively argues, courts should view the 501(c)(3)
prohibition unconstitutional as applied to churches.
V. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SCHEME
Because of the policy concerns and constitutional problems surrounding the
current I.R.C. campaign regulations, scholars and Congresspersons have
proposed various amendments or alternatives to the current 501(c)(3) standard.
Each of these proposals has benefits and drawbacks, and none of them offers a
complete solution. The Houses of Worship Act, however, represents the best
effort at reconciling religious freedom with the integrity of the tax scheme.
4. Repeal
One alternative would be to simply remove the campaign prohibition.
65
After all, the prohibition is an addition made to the tax code without much
foresight or discussion, and Congress has done little since its adoption to
provide a comprehensive rationale for it. Yet it seems that Congress does have a
legitimate, rational basis for not granting tax exemptions to campaign
162. Putney, supra note 105, at 30.
163. Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989).
164. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440,451 (1969); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985).
165. See, e.g., H.R. 2275, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007). H.R. 2275 is the most recent effort of
Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina to remedy the unconstitutional effect of the
application of 501(c)(3)'s campaign prohibition to churches. The resolution provides in
pertinent part: "Paragraph (3) of section 501 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating
to list of exempt organizations) is amended by striking ', and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office."' Id.
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organizations. Regardless of whether one views exemption as a subsidy or as a
definition of the tax base, it is reasonable for Congress to make campaign
groups pay their way like everyone else.
Congress could take the lesser step of excluding only churches and other
religious organizations from the prohibition. 66 This would eliminate the
Establishment Clause problems associated with enforcement and give churches
the freedom to pursue their mission without having to sacrifice tax
exemption. 167 Yet that move might itself violate the Establishment Clause;
opponents likely would argue that it lacks a secular purpose and has the primary
effect of promoting religion. Avoiding entanglement with religion is a valid
secular purpose, but granting churches a tax benefit unavailable to similar,
secular charities likely violates current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 168
An exception for churches might also "open the floodgates to abuse," as one
commentator has said, as campaign organizations would have an incentive to
incorporate as nominally religious groups to gain a tax advantage.
69
B. A "Substantiality" Test
A second alternative would be for Congress to adopt a "substantiality" test
like the one it currently has in place for lobbying activities. 70 This would allow
churches and religious groups to comment on political actors and issues, and
even to engage in some active campaigning, so long as such activity did not
constitute a substantial part of their affairs. As Putney observed, "It is far more
166. See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Act, S. 178, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007). To those
organizations that fall within its ambit, the Religious Freedom Act would provide: "[N]o
organization described in subsection (b) may be denied its Federal tax exemption under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by administrative or judicial action, nor shall donors to such
organization be denied the deductibility of their contributions under such Code, because such
organization engages in an activity that is protected by the United States Constitution, including
comment on public issues, election contests, and pending legislation made in the theological or
philosophical context of such organization." Id. Only religious organizations such as churches,
mosques, synagogues, and temples qualify for the Act's protection. Id. at § 2(b).
167. The Religious Freedom Act of 2007, however, might actually cause problems of
excessive entanglement, as the IRS would have to determine if a given religious organization
meets its criteria for protection, which include factors such as the organization's "ecclesiastical
government," "formal code of doctrine and discipline," "religious history," ordination of
ministers, literature, services, and outreach programs. S. 178, 110th Cong. § 2(b) (2007).
168. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 1 (1989).
169. Erik J. Albin, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church
Participation in Political Campaigns, 13 NoTRE DAME J.L. Erics & PUB. POL'Y 541, 582
(1999).
170. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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practical to judge whether a church has engaged in substantial political
campaigning than it is to absolutely ban such conduct.'
171
The key difficulty under this standard would be to determine when church
campaigning becomes substantial, and the familiar IRS "facts and
circumstances" test would rear its ugly, inconsistent head. 172 Although IRS
regulations and rulings eventually would provide some guidance, 173 churches
still would be in the position of wondering whether a particular sermon series,
cultural ministry, or evangelism rally violated the restrictions. A substantiality
standard would be subject to the same (if not greater) entanglement problems
associated with enforcement because it would require auditors to examine not
only the content of the act in question but the overall ministry of the church to
see whether campaigning was a substantial part of church activities.
Moreover, a substantiality test still would operate as a content-based
restriction on church speech and a substantial burden on the free exercise of
their religion. The focus would still be on the content of the religious program,
requiring an investigation of an even larger scale. Thus, a substantiality test
would only move the margins back and would present all the infirmities of the
current law.
C. A Percentage Test
In 1996, Representatives Philip Crane and Charles Rangel proposed the
Religious Political Freedom Act, which would have amended 501(c)(3) to
allow churches to spend a specified percentage of their gross revenues on
political campaigning. 174 The Act would have permitted churches to spend up
to five percent of gross revenues on campaigning and up to twenty percent of
gross revenues on lobbying, so long as the combined campaigning and lobbying
amounts did not exceed twenty percent.175 Crane explained the proposed bill as
an encouragement for political participation and a protection of religious
liberty: "[The Act] seeks to expand participation in the political process.
Allowing churches to exercise their First Amendment rights without fearing the
loss of their tax-exempt status is not a partisan issue., 176
171. Putney, supra note 105, at 30 (emphasis included).
172. Ablin, supra note 168, at 584.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 585.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Philip M. Crane, Q: Should Churches Be Able to Lobby Congress and
Support Candidates? Yes: Churches Have a Constitutional Right to Promote Candidates They
Endorse, INSIGHT MAG. Nov. 18, 1996, at 24).
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Although the Act died in committee and was not reintroduced the following
term, it has a significant appeal because it provides a bright-line rule. Under its
terms, churches would be free to pursue political endeavors so long as their
political expenditures did not exceed the stated percentage. This would
promote consistency, predictability, and confidence in an otherwise unsettled
and arbitrarily enforced area of law. Moreover, it would not provide an
incentive for candidates or parties to form sham religious organizations to gain
tax advantages.
Because the Act's scope is limited to churches, it invites the criticism that it
has a religious purpose and the primary effect of advancing religion, in
violation of the Establishment Clause. Providing the same lobbying and
campaign freedoms to all 501 (c)(3) groups would fix that, but Congress might
be reluctant to grant such a sweeping provision, taking such a corporately large
percentage of political activity out of the tax base.
D. Using FEC Guidelines in the Tax Context
Some legal scholars have advocated that Congress apply the standards of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to determine what political activities
are permitted for tax-exempt organizations.1 77 FECA requires organizations
that communicate on behalf of "clearly identified" candidates to disclose their
expenditures if the communication constitutes "express advocacy." 178 The
Supreme Court has defined express advocacy to include only unambiguous
statements that encourage citizens to vote for or against a candidate.' 79 An
example of the application of this narrow definition can be seen in FEC v.
Christian Action Network, where the Fourth Circuit ruled that a Christian
advocacy organization did not violate FECA by failing to report expenditures
related to a television commercial it aired during the 1992 presidential election
campaign.' The television advertisement sought to link Bill Clinton to "the
homosexual agenda."' 8' The court held that it was appropriate for the
organization not to disclose its expenditures because the ad did not use explicit
instructions such as "don't vote for Clinton.' ' 2
177. See Laura B. Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposalfor Peaceful Coexistence, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308, 362 (1990); Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS:
Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L.
REV. 217, 259-63 (1992).
178. Ablin, supra note 168, at 583.
179. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42-45 (1976).
180. FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
181. Id. at 1057.
182. Id.
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An application of this standard to the tax code would allow churches to
participate in political activities that do not amount to express advocacy.
Although a FECA-based test would present a brighter line than the current
I.R.C. provision, it would not completely eliminate questions about whether a
minister's stinging chastisement of a candidate from the pulpit amounts to
prohibited conduct. In the case of All Saints Episcopal Church, for example,
Reverand Regas's hypothetical, accusatory conversation with President Bush
followed by his admonition to the audience to vote their values and conscience
might fit even within the narrow definition of express advocacy.
Some would argue that a FECA-based test would go too far in allowing
churches and religious groups to do everything but say "vote for candidate
x.' 83 Others would contend that such a rule does not go far enough.'18 If a
pastor is truly motivated by his faith to warn parishioners not to vote for a
candidate, why should he have to couch his admonition in "issue advocacy"
language? In short, the FECA definitions do not fully accommodate religious
freedom.
E. The Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act
In 2005, Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina offered a
definitional solution in H.R. 235, entitled "The Houses of Worship Free Speech
Restoration Act."' 185 H.R. 235 would have amended Section 501 of the I.R.C.
by adding the following provision as subsection (p):
An organization described in section 170(b)(1)(a)(1) or section
508(c)(1)(A) (relating to churches) shall not fail to be treated as
organized and operated exclusively for a religious purpose, nor shall
it be deemed to have participated in, or intervened in any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office, for purposes of subsection (c)(3), or section 1 70(c)(2), 2055,
2106, 2522, or 4905 because of the content, preparation, or
presentation of any homily, sermon, teaching, dialectic, or other
presentation made during religious services or gatherings.t86
Its solution is definitional in that it does not propose an exception or addition to
any other provision of the tax code. Rather, it explains that religious speech is
included within the definition of "religious purpose" and clarifies that such
183. Albin, supra note 168, at 584.
184. Kemmitt, supra note 22, at 177-78.
185. H.R. 235, 109th Cong. §1 (2005).
186. Id.; see also HR235.org, http://www.HR235.org, (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
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speech is not included within the meaning of "participation" or "intervention"
in a political campaign.
In this sense, the Houses of Worship Act is unremarkable. It seems
unthinkable that a church could be deemed not to operate exclusively for a
religious purpose based on the content of a religious service. Yet the IRS
investigation of All Saints Episcopal Church demonstrates that such an idea is
not far-fetched. Although the Act would not provide absolute protection for all
of a church's political activity, it would shield core religious functions from
serving as the basis for a revocation of tax exemption. It would alleviate the
blatant First Amendment violations that plague the current prohibition. And it
would provide a bright-line rule that allows ministers and congregations to
admonish one another in the faith, even in the subject of civic duties.
1. Judging the Probable Effect of the Houses of Worship Act
The Houses of Worship Act would clarify the rationale behind tax
exemptions for churches because it constitutes an effort to further define the
applicable tax base. In other words, the fact that religious expression cannot
serve as the basis for a tax revocation indicates that it is non-taxable activity
rather than subsidized activity. It is outside the authority of Congress to
penalize an entity for exercising a First Amendment right. The Act takes a step
in the right direction by defining religious expression as excluded from IRS
evaluation.
In so doing, the Act eliminates the content-based restriction in 501 (c)(3) as
applied to religious speech. Under the current code, every church, at least in
theory, retains or forfeits its tax-exempt status every week based on the content
of the sermon, homily, or teachings. If a minister preaches on themes in no way
touching on current political campaigns, he remains within the permitted scope
of religious activity. If he, however, uses a sermon illustration that praises or
criticizes current candidates, or even delves too deeply into social issues that are
deeply associated with a candidate, he runs the risk of "intervening" in the
campaign. The Act does away with this content-based distinction. At the same
time, it eliminates the entanglement problem associated with the current
prohibition. IRS agents no longer have cause to investigate or monitor the
religious conduct of churches in an effort to glean the political from the sacred.
It is important to note that the Houses of Worship Act is not a cure-all for
church concerns in this area. Even if the Act had been the law during the
Church at Pierce Creek investigation, the church likely would have lost its tax-
exempt status anyway. This amendment would only cover religious speech that
occurs in the context of a worship service or similar gathering; it would not
protect financial expenditures or speech outside of a strict ecclesiastical context.
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One could argue that the measure does not accomplish enough. The Church at
Pierce Creek urgently contended that it was part of its religious duty to warn
other Christians about the sinful approaches Bill Clinton was taking to major
moral issues. 187 While this argument is not without merit, the Act shields those
core ecclesiastical functions that have been traditionally protected under the
Constitution. Although it may not be a perfect solution, it is a good example of
how Congress can act incrementally to address a problem.
2. Judging the Constitutionality of the Houses of Worship Act
Some critics opine that the Houses of Worship Act violates the
Establishment Clause because it applies only to churches. Indeed, this is the
major problem with the Crane/Rangel amendment and other alternatives that
provide a benefit to churches that is denied other non-profit organizations. Yet
the Act does not confer a benefit at all. It is not providing an exemption or
exception that is unavailable to other groups. It simply gives a defmition of
terms already used in 501(c). The definitions are needed particularly to
eliminate entanglement concerns that do not exist outside the church context.
The Act is thus an appropriate and constitutional measure to combat the evils of
the current 501(c)(3) campaign prohibition in its application to churches.
VI. CONCLUSION
The I.R.C. prohibition on the campaign activities of religious organizations
is a controversial issue that needs Congress' immediate attention. Congress
should amend the prohibition to respect the religious freedom of the church.
The history of church tax exemption reveals that it is a practice deeply rooted in
the legal history of America. The nature of tax exemptions for churches
involves a recognition that churches, at least in their core functions of religious
expression, are outside of the appropriate tax base. Congress has no authority
to condition exemptions on a surrender of the right to this expression because
such a condition clearly violates the Free Speech Clause, even if not violating
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Several
alternatives are available to the current scheme, but the Houses of Worship Act
best eliminates the policy and constitutional concerns associated with the
prohibition without raising significant problems in its own right.
187. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
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